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GLOBAL RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE SORTING, TRACKING, AND MONITORING PROJECT PHASE I FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
As a proof of concept tested in an operational context, the Global Radiological Source Sorting, Tracking, and Monitoring (GRadSSTraM) Project successfully demonstrated that radio frequency identification (RFID) and Web 2.0* technologies can be deployed to track controlled shipments between the United States and the European Union. Between November 2009 and May 2010, a total of 19 shipments were successfully shipped from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and tracked to their delivery at England's National Physical Laboratory (NPL) by the United Kingdom Royal Mail. However, the project can only be viewed as a qualified success as notable shortcomings were observed. Although the origin and terminus of all RFID-enabled shipments were recorded and no shipments were lost, not all the waypoints between ORNL and NPL were incorporated into the pilot. Given limited resources, the project team was able to install RFID listeners/actuators at three waypoints between the two endpoints. Although it is likely that all shipments followed the same route between ORNL and NPL, it cannot be determined beyond question that all 19 shipments were routed on identical itineraries past the same three waypoints. The pilot also raises the distinct possibility that unattended RFID tracking alone, without positive confirmation that a tagged item has been properly recorded by an RFID reader, does not meet a rigorous standard for shipping controlled items. Indeed, the proof of concept test strongly suggests that a multifaceted approach to tracking may be called for, including tracking methods that are capable of reading and accepting multiple inputs for individual items [e.g., carrier-provided tracking numbers, Universal Product Codes (UPCs), and RFID tags]. For controlled items, another apparent requirement is a confirmation feature, human or otherwise, which can certify that an item's RFID tag, UPC, or tracking number has been recorded. 2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regard to probability of tag detection and operational reliability at checkpoints and choke points in the supply chain process network.
BACKGROUND
3. Determine whether implementation of these systems will help to reduce regulatory burden and enhance transatlantic trade.
4. Demonstrate that RFID tracking and monitoring of radioactive materials is ready for Phase II testing using commercial isotope shippers and carriers.
5. Establish a prototype Web 2.0 site to enhance the use of tracking technologies internationally.
To address these objectives, the ConOps document prescribed a proof of concept test involving deployment of an RFID tracking network to monitor radioisotope shipments between ORNL and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in Teddington, United Kingdom (UK). The progress of the shipments would be displayed on a Web 2.0 Google Maps mashup ( Figure 1 ) identifying the location of each shipment as it progressed through its route and was scanned by the prepositioned RFID listeners/actuators.
Early in the implementation of the plan, adjustments were required to keep the project on budget and to reduce any safety concerns for the participants. The original operational requirements (followed by qualifying notes indicating actual practice as a result of the required adjustments) included the following:
1. Limited quantity (Ltd Qty) radioactive material; RFID modified inner containers with electronic seal.
NOTE: Because of safety concerns, radioactive materials were eliminated from the shipments, and surrogate containers were shipped and tracked. 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Between November 2009 and May 2010, a total of 19 shipments were routed from ORNL to NPL (see Annex A, -ORNL Shipment List‖).
1. All 19 shipments were tagged at ORNL, and the origin of the shipment was scanned and recorded on the GRadSSTraM Web site.
2. All 19 shipments were scanned at the receiving terminus at NPL, and their arrival was scanned and recorded on the GRadSSTraM site.  the RFID reader at Heathrow may have been at a location the shipments did not pass,  the reader may not have been operational at all times, and  the shipments may have passed through an alternative airport or carrier 4. Although the ORNL shipments to NPL were not automatically recorded by the RFID scanner at the Knoxville Post Office, the GRadSSTraM web site allowed for users to manually record shipments. If USPS access to and use of the GRadSSTraM web site had been exploited at the Knoxville office, the GRadSSTraM shipments through there could have been recorded manually. Moreover, the internal FedEx tracking number that was assigned to the shipment between Knoxville and Miami could have been annotated, permitting the web site to track the shipment through the FedEx distribution points.
5. Although the origin and terminus of all RFID-enabled shipments were recorded and no shipments were lost, not all the waypoints between ORNL and NPL were recorded for each shipment. At various times, RFID sensors at intervening waypoints did not record and report shipments. At Miami, for example, where there were two readers, there were some shipments that were -read‖ by one of the listeners/actuators (sometimes several times) but not by the other. Although the reasons for the missing tracks cannot be explained in every case, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn from the circumstances. The most likely explanation is that a tagged item was not scanned because it did not come within range of the listener/actuator. It is also possible, although perhaps less likely, that a particular shipment could have been routed through a different path out of the range of the reader. In the cases of the Knoxville station and the 15 shipments that were not -read‖ at Heathrow, there is the possibility that the readers were not operational. At Heathrow, there is also the unlikely possibility that the 15 items were not routed through the airport-unlikely because most shipments from Miami to England are routed through Heathrow. In general, operator training in the use of GRadSSTraM, as well as awareness of its capabilities, would have improved access to alternative tracking information along a particular shipment's route. The pilot, given limited resources, was deployed at only three known waypoints between the two known endpoints, and it is not clear whether all 19 shipments followed identical itineraries. The pilot also raises the distinct possibility that unattended RFID tracking alone, without positive confirmation that a tagged item has been properly recorded by an RFID reader, does not meet a rigorous standard for shipping controlled items. Indeed, this proof of concept test strongly suggests the need for a multifaceted approach to tracking such as a tracking tool that is capable of reading and accepting multiple tracking inputs [e.g., carrier-provided tracking numbers, Universal Product Codes (UPCs), and RFID tags]. For controlled items, there is a concurrent requirement for a confirmation feature, human or otherwise, which can certify that an item's RFID tag, UPC, or tracking number has been recorded.
The following are the specific findings for the objectives outlined under the technical approach.
1. Validate the performance of Web 2.0 enabled RFID tracking systems to monitor Express Post shipments of radioisotopes in the international supply chain.
The Phase I effort was a qualified success. Clearly the Web 2.0 Google Maps mashup was able to automatically display the RFID annotations and also display any annotations that were manually posted to the shipment along the way (e.g., the ORNL-19 forms). The GRadSSTraM Web 2.0 tracking tool offers great potential as a multifaceted tracking tool that can bridge different legacy and emerging technologies. Continued development and testing, with end-user participation in future pilots, is strongly recommended.
2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regards to probability of tag detection and operational reliability at checkpoints and choke points in the supply chain process network.
The RFID listeners/actuators worked 100% of the time at ORNL and NPL. At those two locations, there were operators who confirmed that the tag was -read.‖ At Miami, where two readers were deployed, all 19 shipments were recorded by at least one reader and reported to the Google Maps mashup. At Heathrow, where one reader was deployed, 4 of the 19 shipments were recorded and reported. Additional methods, using either existing tracking capabilities, redundant sensors, or new external checks, are necessary before an unattended RFID sensor can be relied upon to track a controlled item with 100% assurance.
The current pilot did not provide data to suggest that either RFID or Web 2.0 technologies alone will reduce regulations or streamline processes for securing transatlantic trade. However, there is the potential that these two emerging technologies, combined with operational methods and practices and links to enterprise tracking systems, can improve the security of shipments and, thereby, increase the enforcement of regulations and, ultimately, reduce loss and improve accountability in the commercial networks.
The results of Phase I, which was conducted with minimal funding, demonstrate that both RFID and emerging Web 2.0 technologies have future roles in securing the supply chain.
5. Establish a prototype standard architecture to enhance the use of tracking technologies internationally.
While there is insufficient evidence to specify a standard future architecture for tracking shipments, there is ample evidence to suggest that such an architecture will be heterogeneous and not homogeneous. Some aspects of shipping will continue to be manually logged; others will be tracked by legacy enterprise solutions (e.g., scanners and UPCs). Still newer technologies (e.g., Global Positioning System, social media, and social networks) will be a part of the supply chain future.
RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS
A broader and more robust deployment of Web 2.0 and RFID technologies, with the active participation of the public and private practitioners involved in the supply chain, is justified and will likely result in moving these nascent technologies closer to adoption.
SUMMARY
As a proof of concept tested in an operational context, Phase I of GRadSSTraM demonstrated that RFID and Web 2.0 technologies can be deployed to track controlled shipments between the United States and EU. Between November 2009 and May 2010, a total of 19 shipments were successfully shipped from ORNL by USPS and tracked to their delivery at NPL by the UK Royal Mail. Although the efficacy of RFID and Web 2.0 technologies for international tracking was demonstrated, Phase I can only be viewed as a preliminary and qualified success; notable shortcomings were observed. For example, the origin and terminus of all RFID-enabled shipments were recorded and no shipments were lost; however, not all the waypoints between ORNL and NPL were incorporated into the pilot. Given limited resources, the project team was able to install RFID listeners/actuators at three waypoints between the two endpoints. Although it is likely that all shipments followed the same route between ORNL and NPL, it cannot be determined beyond question that all 19 shipments were routed on identical itineraries past the same three waypoints. The pilot also raises the distinct possibility that unattended RFID tracking alone, without positive confirmation that a tagged item has been properly recorded by an RFID reader, does not meet a rigorous standard for shipping controlled items. This proof of concept test strongly suggests the need for a multifaceted approach to tracking such as a tracking method that is capable of reading and accepting multiple tracking inputs (e.g., carrier-provided tracking numbers, UPCs, and RFID tags). For controlled items, another apparent requirement is a confirmation feature, human or otherwise, which can substantiate that an item's RFID tag, UPC, or tracking number has been recorded.
